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When in Doubt, Forbear!
Does it really matter at this point in time 
that the interested scientific community 
agrees to a single definition of ‘hypnosis’? 
Would accepting to label hypnosis an alleged 
altered state do the trick?  Or is it simply that 
Wagstaff is proposing to replace the hyp-
nosis in quotation marks à la Barber by the 
word alleged?
One of Wagstaff’s central argument is 
that as theoretical explanations of hypnotic 
effects have diversified and complexified 
over time, we have distanced ourselves from 
our roots.  Did we really?  Was animal mag-
netism or lucid sleep or artificial somnam-
bulism clearly seen as altered states by their 
proponents?  Certainly not by Mesmer who 
conceived of animal magnetism as a neu-
ro-physiological process nor by Faria who 
linked the époptes (somnambulists) in part 
to a physiological condition, thin blood.  If 
a participant proved difficult to magnetize, 
blood letting would do marvels.  Thin blood 
was a necessary although not sufficient con-
dition.  Faria identified a number of individ-
ual differences that needed to be present in 
the participant.  One of these was the capac-
ity to misattribute the effects experienced to 
the influence of the magnetist.  De Puységur 
was probably the closest one to mention a 
curious state in the somnambulist that tran-
scended the natural state of affairs.  But then 
again, he used to magnetize his servants over 
which he had the right of life and death… 
(see Ellenberger, 1965, for a sociological view 
of de Puységur’s somnambule).  
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Wagstaff travels back to Hénin de 
Cuvillers (1820) who was the first to sug-
gest using words stemming from the Greek 
hupnos, meaning sleep.  He is quite correct. 
However, Hénin de Cuvillers was merely list-
ing Greek words’ roots that could be appro-
priate for the new phenomenon in an attempt 
to distance himself from the pretentions of 
the Animal Magnetists and in some way the 
Puysegurian somnambulists.  He proposed 
more than 650 words derived from Greek 
that he thought could be appropriate.  In the 
long run we did not fare too bad with hypno-
tism; it could have been Phantasiéxoussisme 
(see Gauld, 1992).  All this to say that claim-
ing that our roots originated with the coining 
of the word hypnotism is not quite accurate; 
it may reflect the fact that there was from 
then on a consensus on labeling the pro-
cess but not in identifying what the process 
was; at best a metaphor, an as-if proposition: 
naming a new phenomenon on the basis of 
its resemblance to what is known… and to, 
once again, distance oneself from the delu-
sions and exaggerations of magnetists.  Even 
though there may have been consensus about 
the label, it was not very long for theoreticians 
to once again disagree.  Whereas Bernheim 
saw hypnosis as a normal psychological re-
sponse to suggestions, most of his contempo-
raries were following Charcot who conceived 
of hypnosis as a pathological process, a kind 
a latent hysteria.  Indeed, it is not until the 
twentieth century and the undue influence of 
the psychoanalytic discourse that hypnosis 
was clearly theorized of as an altered state of 
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consciousness rather than the word altered 
being used in a convenient, descriptive, as-if 
metaphor.  
Wagstaff writes at length about the no-
tion of hypnotic depth.  The notion of hyp-
notic depth is also a reflection of the un-
derlying theories that were espoused by 
different theorists whether they were linked 
to the sleep metaphor in the early nineteenth 
century or depth psychology later on.  At 
the end of the nineteenth century the Nancy 
school linked the depth of hypnosis to the 
number of items passed not the depth of the 
state.  For a long time hypnotic depth scales 
provided participants with the actual items 
that should be passed at each level (Laurence 
and Nadon, 1986).  La Salpêtrière took a very 
different approach to explain the variability 
of responses.  They rather described hyp-
notic types (basically three) rather than one 
dimension of depth.  The notion of types is 
certainly an interesting one as it bypasses 
the fact that many participants do not re-
spond or respond minimally to suggestions. 
Typology however has not fared too well 
since few theorists have espoused or devel-
oped the idea.  Nonetheless, most typical 
contemporary standardized inductions (like 
the Harvard Scale) are still worded along 
the depth dimension.  As participants relax, 
they will experience a deeper state of hypno-
sis; can’t really be surprised that depth scores 
correlate quite well with performance scores. 
As Laurence and Nadon (1986) already ob-
served depth reports are indexing the expe-
riential changes more than the behavioral 
ones and maybe reflecting both the expec-
tations and dispositions of the participants 
over and above their actual behavioral re-
sponses.  Experienced depth may mean very 
little other than the participants espousing 
the metaphors we provide them.
Hypnosis (and the alleged depth of it) 
may be at best metaphors for an ensemble of 
phenomena that we either do not grasp yet, 
that is simply too complex to summarize in a 
few words or that may be explained by seem-
ingly irreconcilable theoretical viewpoints.
If anything, reading Wagstaff dem-
onstrates that we have come a long way 
since Gill (1972) depiction of hypnosis as a 
regression in the service of the ego… and 
the centrality of an altered state…  Why go 
back?
Wagstaff is certainly correct in saying 
that most contemporary definitions pro-
posed by scientific or clinical bodies are not 
saying what hypnosis is but rather how it is 
applied and what to expect from the proce-
dure.  Dictionaries and encyclopedias are 
more daring.  They clearly label hypnosis an 
altered state of consciousness.  Dictionaries 
and encyclopedias represent most of the time 
a consensual understanding by non-special-
ists of the phenomena they describe.  They 
do not get involved in the theoretical battles 
of the research world.  Is it necessarily a bad 
thing?  No.  In fact, if I believe Wagstaff (and 
the relevant research) we should be quite 
happy about these lay definitions.  They 
bring food on the table for the hypnotist… 
and they are quite useful in bringing forth 
expected results.  It is a win-win situation.
Would agreeing to the new definitions as 
proposed by Wagstaff change anything? My 
guess is no.  An alleged state is not a defini-
tion; it is the contrary of a definition.  If we 
do not know what it is, then we should stick 
to a simple descriptive and operational ap-
proach.  If I were a CBT practitioner read-
ing Wagstaff, I would be quite worried that 
the definition of my trade could be hypno-
sis.  But then could I really explain how re-
structuring brings cognitive and emotional 
changes, other than once again using vague 
terminology?  It certainly seems to me that 
in the absence of a clear answer, emphasizing 
vagueness and uncertainty is not the answer. 
It certainly won’t stop disagreements.  For 
one, I would disagree.  I do not believe that a 
hypnotized individual is in an altered state, 
merely in one of many variations of a normal 
state of consciousness.  The basic premise of 
the social-psychological approach was not to 
deny that hypnotized individuals believe to 
be in an altered state.  They merely pointed 
out that one does not need that concept to 
explain what is experienced during hypno-
sis.  To cite Wagstaff and Cole (2005): 
The main thrust of the nonstate criticism 
of hypnosis as an ASC has not been to deny 
that hypnotic subjects experience ASCs, but 
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that the concept of an ASC unique to hyp-
nosis is unhelpful (and even misleading) in 
explaining the phenomena we associate with 
hypnosis (including reports of ASCs them-
selves; Wagstaff, 2005, p. 15).
An alleged altered state would not fare 
better.  Which brings me to the definition of 
a normal state of consciousness.  Oops! That’s 
right, we do not really have a unified defini-
tion of what is a normal state of conscious-
ness, other than as vague and diverse as they 
can be.  Bummer! Then how do we identify 
what is an altered state of consciousness?  If 
one agrees with Revonsuo et al’s (2009) defi-
nition of an altered state, it would be a state 
that misrepresents the actual state of affairs 
internally or externally.  Do the hypnotic 
induction procedures misrepresent internal 
or external reality?  Most likely not.  In fact 
what the participants report is well in line 
with what is happening and what they are 
led to expect.  They feel relaxed and comfort-
able.  It is only once specific suggestions are 
administered that participants may report 
some misrepresentational aspects of reality.
Wagstaff is correct in describing the hyp-
notic induction as orienting expectations 
that an altered state will happen.  Indeed, 
most studies that have looked at expecta-
tions of what happens in hypnosis found 
them to be reasonably good predictors of 
hypnotic responses.  The context is relevant 
in as much as participants also have the 
abilities to produce the suggested effects.  So 
the idea of an altered state (alleged or not) 
is quite irrelevant from the experimenter’s 
point of view.  As Faria wrote, it is the par-
ticipant that needs to misattribute, not the 
experimenter.
Would defining hypnosis as an alleged 
altered state help us understand better what 
is happening when participants volunteer to 
be hypnotized?  Most likely not.  Would it re-
ally help researchers and clinicians get a bet-
ter sense of what they are doing or studying? 
Most likely not either.  The answer really is 
not to be found in the definition of hypnosis 
at this point, simply because we still do not 
understand what exactly is happening dur-
ing hypnosis. 
In the end I will have to pass on Wagstaff’s 
propositions and suggest that we continue to 
live with a descriptive, operational defini-
tion, and enjoy the theoretical battles until 
we can have some better idea of the actual 
mechanisms at play during hypnosis.
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